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Abstract. This study tested the hypothesis that trauma memories are disjointed from other
autobiographical materialinposttraumaticstressdisorder(PTSD).Assaultsurvivorswith(n=
25) and without PTSD (n = 49) completed an autobiographical memory retrieval task during
script-driven imagery of (a) the assault and (b) an unrelated negative event. When listening to a
taped imagery script of the worst moment of their assault, survivors with PTSD took longer to
retrieve unrelated non-traumatic autobiographical information than those without PTSD, but
not when listening to a taped script of the worst moment of another negative life event. The
groups also did not differ in general retrieval latencies, neither at baseline nor after the imagery
tasks. The ﬁndings are in line with suggestions that traumatic memories are less integrated
with other autobiographical information in trauma survivors with PTSD than in those without
PTSD.
Keywords: Posttraumatic stress disorder, autobiographical memory, memory fragmentation,
script-driven imagery, cognitive processing.
Introduction
Involuntary re-experiencing is a hallmark symptom of posttraumatic stress disorder (e.g.
Horowitz, 1976). Involuntary trauma memories are easily triggered by a wide range of stimuli
(e.g. Ehlers, Hackmann and Michael, 2004; Foa and Rothbaum, 1998) and usually take
the form of relatively brief sensory impressions such as images, sounds, tastes or smells
(e.g. Ehlers et al., 2002), which are accompanied by the original emotions that the individual
experiencedatthetimeoftheevent(FoaandRothbaum,1998;EhlersandClark,2000).Patients
withPTSDusuallyhaveasmallnumberofintrusivememoriesthatcankeepre-occurringinthe
sameformforyears(Hackmann,Ehlers,SpeckensandClark,2004).Thesecorrespondclosely
to the most distressing moments of the trauma (Holmes, Grey and Young, 2005). There is a
debateintheliteratureaboutwhetherandinwhatwayintrusivememoriesinPTSDaredifferent
from other involuntary memories in everyday life. Some studies emphasize similarities (e.g.
Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004; Ball and Little, 2006), while others emphasize differences
(e.g. Peace and Porter, 2004; Berntsen, Willert and Rubin, 2003; Megias, Ryan, Vaquero and
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Frese, 2007). Nevertheless, the persistence and frequency of intrusive memories in PTSD
needs explanation.
Theories of unwanted trauma memories
Why do people with PTSD keep experiencing unwanted distressing memories of the trauma?
Theories of PTSD concur that such intrusive memories are due to the way trauma memories
are encoded, organized in memory, and retrieved. Several theorists suggest that compromised
cognitiveprocessingduringthetraumaleadstocertaindeﬁcitsintheautobiographicalmemory
for the event that facilitate retrieval of trauma memories to a wide range of stimuli. Several
different hypotheses about the nature of this deﬁcit have been suggested in the literature.
Early theories highlighted a deﬁcit in memory representations that facilitate intentional recall
(Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph, 1996) or highly fragmented memories (Foa and Rothbaum,
1998; Herman, 1992; van der Kolk and Fisler, 1995).
Empirical tests of these hypotheses in clinical populations are sparse. The fragmentation
hypothesis has received some, albeit not always consistent, support (for reviews see McNally,
2003; Ehlers et al., 2004). There is evidence that trauma survivors with PTSD give more
disorganized narratives of traumatic events than those without PTSD (e.g. Jones, Harvey
and Brewin, 2007; Harvey and Bryant, 1999; Halligan et al., 2003). Ehlers et al. (2004)
further suggested that the proposed deﬁcits may not apply equally to the whole traumatic
event (see also Hellawell and Brewin, 2002). As only some moments of the traumatic event
are later re-experienced, the proposed deﬁcits may mainly apply to the memory of these
moments. Evans, Ehlers, Mezey and Clark (2007) indeed found that trauma narratives around
the time of the intrusive memories were more disorganized than other segments of the trauma
narrative.
“Nowness” and lack of context as important features of intrusive trauma memories
Recent cognitive theories of PTSD build on clinical observations and empirical data showing
that survivors with and without PTSD do not only differ in the frequency of unwanted trauma
memories, but also in their characteristics. Two aspects of intrusive memories in PTSD are
particularly interesting from a theoretical point of view. First, trauma survivors with PTSD
describetoagreaterextentthatintrusivememoriesappeartohappeninthe“hereandnow”than
those without PTSD (Ehlers and Clark, 2000). This sense of “nowness” is more predictive
of subsequent PTSD than the frequency of intrusive memories (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan
and Clark, 2004). Second, Ehlers and Clark (2000) and Ehlers et al. (2004) observed that
intrusive memories appear disjointed from other relevant autobiographical information. They
describe cases of patients with PTSD who (1) kept re-experiencing an intrusive memory
of an earlier part of the trauma as well as another intrusive memory from another part
of the trauma that contradicted the individual’s impressions during the ﬁrst memory; and
(2) kept re-experiencing moments of the trauma and the corresponding emotions although
they knew the predicted horriﬁc outcome did not occur (e.g. they were still living with
their children although they expected during the trauma never to see them again). Thus,
during retrieval of the intrusive memories, the patients had difﬁculties retrieving subsequent
information that corrected their original impressions and predictions during these moments.
This relative lack of contextual information distinguished between the intrusive memories ofTrauma memories in PTSD 223
trauma survivors with and without PTSD and predicted subsequent PTSD (Michael et al.,
2004).
Poor integration into the autobiographical memory base as an explanation
for intrusive memories
On the basis of these observations, Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggested that one of the factors
leading to intrusive memories in PTSD is that the worst moments of the trauma memory
are poorly elaborated and inadequately linked with their context of relevant subsequent
and preceding information and other autobiographical memories. This suggestion builds
on Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model of autobiographical memory. Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce proposed that autobiographical memories are transitory dynamic mental
constructions, which are retrieved from an “autobiographical memory base”, where each
speciﬁc memory is stored as part of a general event, which in turn is part of a lifetime
period. One of the functions of the incorporation of memories into the autobiographical
memory base is thought to be the inhibition of cue-driven unintentional memory retrieval.
Poor incorporation of trauma memories would have the consequence that unintentional
memories can be easily triggered by matching cues, and are experienced without a context of
other information, which would give them a sense of “nowness”. There are several reasons
for why such poor incorporation could occur. Ehlers and Clark (2000) and Ehlers et al.
(2004) highlight the role of cognitive processing during the trauma, in particular data-driven
processing (i.e. predominant processing of sensory information), dissociation and lack of
binding. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggest that during a traumatic experience there
are no current goals and plans that may mediate integration of the experience, resulting in
an event-speciﬁc memory representation with no contextualizing abstract autobiographical
knowledge.
Aims of the present study
To our knowledge, no study to date has experimentally tested the hypothesis that trauma
memories are poorly integrated with other autobiographical information. The present study
aimed to provide such an experimental test in a sample of assault survivors. Script-driven
imagery was used to induce memories of (a) the traumatic event and (b) an unrelated
negative event that happened at about the same time. We used the speed with which
participants could retrieve other autobiographical information during the imagery as an
indirect measure of the degree of integration of a memory within the autobiographical
memory base. If the worst moments of trauma memories are poorly integrated into the
autobiographical memory base, this would delay the speed with which other autobiographical
information is retrieved. We expected that participants with PTSD would take longer
to retrieve non-trauma autobiographical information while imagining the worst moment
of their assault (“hot spot”, Foa and Rothbaum, 1998, Ehlers and Clark, 2000)), when
compared to (a) participants without PTSD (between-subject) and (b) imagining the worst
moment of another negative event (within-subject). In addition, we expected that the
delay in retrieval during trauma hot spots would be correlated with re-experiencing, in
particular with the “nowness” of intrusive memories, and with cognitive processing styles
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processing, and lack of binding; Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al.,
2004).
Method
Participants
Assault survivors who had been assaulted more than 3 months ago were recruited from the
Accident and Emergency Department of an urban teaching hospital in South London via
invitation letter (n = 56), as well as through ﬂyers at local news agents (n = 29). Of 85 assault
survivors who attended the research session, 74 completed the experimental task described
in this paper.1 Twenty-ﬁve of these (34%) met diagnostic criteria for PTSD according to
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID, First, Spitzer, Gibbon and Williams,
1996). The assaults were mainly physical attacks (96%), and a minority (4%) were sexual
assaults. Table 1 compares the demographic and clinical characteristics of PTSD and no-
PTSD groups. The PTSD group were less likely to be Caucasian, less likely to be working,
and had lower incomes than the no-PTSD group. As expected, the PTSD group reported more
severe symptoms of PTSD and depression. The groups did not differ in objective assault
severity, as measured by a composite score described below (Dunmore, Clark and Ehlers,
1999).
Experimental task
Generationofimageryscripts. Imageryscriptsfortheassaultandanon-traumaticnegative
event that had happened at approximately the same time as the assault were generated
following the procedure described by Blanchard, Hickling, Taylor, Loos and Gerardi (1994)
and Blanchard et al. (1996). Participants gave a detailed account of their assault. To facilitate
the identiﬁcation of a suitable negative event, participants were given a list of negative events
(e.g. failing a test, burglary, argument with friends) and asked to choose which one applied to
them. They then gave a detailed account of this event. Next, participants indicated which items
fromalistof bodily and emotional responses (e.g. “heart racing”, “breathing heavily”) applied
to them during the assault and the negative event, respectively. They also speciﬁed the worst
moment of the assault and the negative event, respectively (hot spot). From the participants’
descriptions and their reported bodily reactions, imagery scripts were constructed and audio
taped (see also Pitman, Orr and Steketee, 1989). These described the events in the second
person and in the present tense (e.g. “You are going down the street when you hear footsteps
behind you ...”). Scripts were tape-recorded in a neutral tone of voice. The tapes were timed
to last approximately 2 minutes, and included up to ﬁve of the bodily responses. All scripts
were timed as precisely as possible to reach the worst moment of the assault/negative event
after one minute.
Autobiographical memory retrieval during script-driven imagery. The experimental task
tested the time it took participants to answer questions from the Autobiographical Memory
1Those who did not complete the task did not differ signiﬁcantly from the rest of the sample in terms of demographic
and clinical variables (all p’s > .206).Trauma memories in PTSD 225
Table 1. Participant characteristics
PTSD (N = 25)
No-PTSD
(N = 49)
Variable n % n % Analysis χ2 (df); p
Sex
Male 12 48 33 67 2.99 (1. 73); .084
Female 13 52 16 33
Ethnic Group
Caucasian 10 40 33 67 4.78 (1, 73); .029
Non-Caucasian 15 60 16 33
Socio-economic status (household income)1
Low (less than £10,000) 21 100 14 29 27.28 (3, 66); .000
Moderate (£10,000– £40,000) 0 0 23 47
High income (over £40.000) 0 0 9 18
Refused information 4 - 3 6
Marital status
Single 17 68 28 57 3.41 (2, 73); .182
Married 4 16 4 8
Divorced/separated 4 16 17 35
Education
No exams 7 28 6 12 7.62 (4, 73); .106
GCSE2 or equivalent 11 44 18 37
AL e v e l 3 or equivalent 3 12 6 12
Vocational degree 2 8 3 6
University degree 2 8 16 33
Employment status
Employed/studying 10 40 38 78 9.86 (1, 73); .002
Unemployed/retired 15 60 11 22
M(SD) M(SD) F (df); p
Assault severity4 5.80 (1.06) 5.31 (1.36) 2.12 (1, 67); .150
Age 33.24 (10.76) 34.92 (10.59) .41 (1, 72); .525
PTSD symptom severity (PDS) 30.38 (10.85) 11.65 (7.71) 71.45 (1, 72); .000
Depression symptom severity
(BDI)
23.44 (10.97) 10.73 (8.63) 29.53 (1, 72); .000
Notes: 1combined household income; 2equivalent to 11 years of education; 3equivalent to 13 years of
education; 4composite score scale: 0–8.
Inventory (AMI; Kopelman, Wilson and Baddeley, 1989) while imagining the assault and the
other negative event described in the scripts. Before the task, participants were instructed to
listen carefully to the tapes with their eyes closed, and to imagine the event as vividly as
possible, as if they were actually participating in it. The experimenter explained that each
tape would be interrupted twice to answer some questions, and asked participants to answer
the questions as quickly as possible. Before listening to the tapes, participants answered two
baseline questions from the AMI (“Where did you spend last Christmas?” and “When you
were a child, where did you live before you went to primary school?”)226 B. Kleim et al.
The two imagery tapes were then played in counterbalanced order. Each tape was stopped
at the worst moment of the assault/negative event at approximately 1 minute, and at the end
of the script. At both time points, participants answered questions about autobiographical
information from the AMI, such as the place where they spent their last birthday or the name
of a teacher. Half of the questions asked about recent memories (e.g. questions about their
last birthday or holiday), the other half asked about past memories (e.g. the name of the street
where participants grew up, or the name of their primary school). The same questions were
used for each participant. Questions were determined randomly for the trauma and negative
event tapes, with the restriction that one past and one recent question was asked during each
tape condition. Participants’ answers were tape-recorded and memories were later transcribed.
The latency to retrieve the (ﬁrst) answer for each question was measured using a stopwatch.
When an answer was inappropriate (e.g. no autobiographical memory, or response did not
answer the speciﬁc question), and participants had been prompted during the task, latencies to
subsequent responses to cues were accumulated.
Manipulation checks. Participants rated tape imageability (how much of the tape’s
description they could picture in their own mind) on a scale from 0 to 100%. For each
tape, they also rated the perceived vividness of imagery, the degree to which they felt that
the event was happening again, and whether there was something disturbing about the voice
on the tape (on scales from 0 to 10). In addition, participants rated the intensity with which
they experienced negative emotions (7 items, anxious, angry, sad, furious, hopeless, ashamed,
guilty; α = .89 for the assault tape, α = .87 for the negative event tape) and dissociation
(3 items, detached, numb, unreal, α = .80 assault tape, α = .85 negative event tape) while
listening to each of the scripts, each on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0=not at all, 10=very
much.
Demographic and assault characteristics
Sociodemographic information. A semistructured interview adapted from Halligan et al.
(2003) was used to obtain demographic information, and a comprehensive assessment of
assault characteristics.
Objective assault severity. Objective assault severity was scored as a composite score
from the following severity indices: number of assailants, assault duration, injury severity, and
weapon usage (Dunmore et al., 1999).
Clinical symptoms and processing measures
PTSD diagnosis and clinical symptoms. The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
(SCID, First et al., 1996) was conducted by two trained masters/doctoral level psychologists
to determine whether participants met diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Interrater reliability was
high,κ =.82(basedon56interviews,2raters).PTSDsymptomseveritywasassessedusingthe
PosttraumaticDiagnosticScale(PDS;Foa,Cashman,JaycoxandPerry,1997),avalidatedand
widely used self-report measure of PTSD symptom severity. The Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979), a standardized questionnaire of established
reliability and validity, assessed the severity of depressive symptoms.
Nowness of intrusive memories. Participants were asked to describe their most frequent
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now instead of being something from the past; Hackmann et al., 2004) on a scale from 0 (not
at all) to 100 (very much). The retest-reliability (1-week interval) in a sample of 44 PTSD
patients was r = .68 (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann and Clark, 2006).
Cognitive processing during the assault
Three scales measured the extent to which participants processed the assault in a way that is
thought to lead to disjointed memories (Brewin et al., 1996, Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Ehlers
et al., 2004). Participants rated how much each statement applied to them during the assault
until help arrived, each on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly).
The Data-driven Processing Scale (Halligan et al., 2003) is an 8-item scale that assesses
the extent to which participants primarily engaged in the processing of sensory as opposed
to meaning information during the assault (data-driven processing, e.g. “It was just like a
stream of unconnected impressions following each other”). The scale has been demonstrated
topredictthedevelopmentofanaloguePTSDsymptomsanddisorganizednarrativesfollowing
exposure to a distressing videotape (Halligan, Clark and Ehlers, 2002), and to prospectively
predict PTSD symptoms in trauma survivors (Halligan et al., 2003; Rosario, Ehlers, Williams
and Glucksman, in preparation). The internal consistency was α = .85 in this sample.
The State Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ; Murray, Ehlers and Mayou, 2002, α =
.88) is a 9-item scale assessing different aspects of dissociation such as derealization,
depersonalization, detachment, altered time sense, emotional numbing, and reduction of
awareness in surroundings. The SDQ showed good reliability and validity in traumatized
and nontraumatized samples (Halligan et al., 2002, 2003; Murray et al., 2002). It correlates
strongly with the Peritraumatic Dissociation Scale (Marmar, Weiss and Meltzer, 1997); r =
.79 (Rosario et al., in preparation). The internal consistency was α = .92 in this sample.
The Lack of Binding Scale is a 5-item exploratory scale developed for the purposes of the
study. It measures the extent to which the participants processed their different experiences
during the assault as unconnected events (e.g. “I felt like nothing linked all that was happening
together”; “Every moment seemed unconnected to others”). The internal consistency was α =
.88 in this sample.
Procedure
The study was approved by the local ethics committees. Assault survivors were contacted
by letter and telephone. The nature of the study was described on the telephone and in an
information sheet. If interested, participants were invited to attend the research session. In
the research session, participants gave written consent after remaining questions had been
answered. They then ﬁlled in the questionnaires (including a number of questionnaires
unrelated to the present study). Participants gave descriptions of their assault and the negative
event, and completed the script-driven imagery task. The Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV followed. Participants were reimbursed with £25 for their time and travel expenses.
Data analysis
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 13.0) was used for all analyses. A series
of analyses of variance compared retrieval times for answers to AMI questions between the
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the data analysis of the memory task because they did not fully comply with task instructions
(n = 4), or retrieval latencies deviated more than two standard deviations from the mean
(n=3).Excludedparticipants(n=7)didnotdiffersigniﬁcantlyinkeydemographicvariables
from those that were included (all p’s > .167), but reported greater PTSD symptom severity,
F(1,71)=5.88,p=.018.Thus,theﬁnalsamplecomprised66participants.Aone-wayANOVA
compared retrieval times for baseline questions. The main analysis was a repeated measures
ANOVA for the imagery hot spots, with group (PTSD vs. no-PTSD) as the between-subject
factor and imagery script (assault, negative event) as the within-subject factor. A similar
analysis was conducted for retrieval latencies at the end of the tapes, and for the manipulation
check variables. To check whether order of imagery scripts inﬂuenced the results, a further
ANOVA included order of tapes as an additional between-subject factor. For correlational
analyses, a difference score was computed by subtracting retrieval times during the negative
eventhotspotfromtherespectiveretrievaltimeduringtheassaulthotspot.Pearsoncorrelations
were calculated as variables were normally distributed. Alpha was set at .05.
Results
Manipulation checks
On average, participants retrieved autobiographical information in response to baseline AMI
questions in 3.48 s (SD = 2.28 s), which is comparable to other studies of autobiographical
memory retrieval (e.g. Conway, 1996). Table 2 shows the manipulation check variables.
There were no main effects or interactions in measures of how well participants could
imagine the events, namely the ratings of imageability, vividness, nowness, and voice
characteristics. The PTSD group rated more negative emotions for both imagery scripts than
the no-PTSD group, F(1, 67)=33.62, p < .001, and greater dissociation, F(1, 67) = 18.45,
p < .001. For dissociation, but not for negative emotions, there was also a main effect of
script, F(1, 67)=16.09, p<.001. Trauma scripts led to greater dissociative symptoms in both
groups. There were no signiﬁcant group x script interactions for the emotion and imagery
emotionality ratings. There were no main effects or interactions for time since the events.
Retrieval of autobiographical information before and after the tapes
ParticipantswithandwithoutPTSDdidnotdifferinthelatencyofretrievalofautobiographical
memories at baseline, MPTSD =3.51, SD=2.96; MNo-PTSD =3.48, SD=2.08; F(1,62)=.01.
p=.962.
Similarly, an ANOVA for retrieval latencies at the end of both tapes yielded no signiﬁcant
main effects for script, F(1, 60) = 1.54, p = .22, or group, F(1, 60)= .71, p = .79, and no
signiﬁcant interaction, F(1, 60) = .46, p = .50. Participants with and without PTSD thus did
not differ in the retrieval latencies measured at the end of both imagery tapes.
Autobiographical memory retrieval during hot spots
The results for latency of autobiographical memory retrieval during the hot spots in the script-
driven imagery task are shown in Table 2 and Figure 1. The ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant
script x group interaction, F(1, 64) = 5.87, p = .018, and no main effects of group, F(1, 64) =Trauma memories in PTSD 229
Table 2. Results of the script-driven imagery task. Means (standard deviations) for autobiographical
memory retrieval latencies and manipulation checks for assault and negative event scripts
Trauma script Negative event script ANOVA
Variable
PTSD
n = 19
No-PTSD
n = 47
PTSD
n = 19
No-PTSD
n = 47
Signiﬁcant
effects, ηp2
Memory retrieval latency
during hot spot in s
4.86 (3.87) 3.34 (2.21) 3.06 (1.87) 3.99 (2.79) Group x script,
ηp2 = .069
Time since event in months 14.9( 1 0 .1) 13.6( 8 .3) 16.0( 1 1 .6) 10.7( 1 0 .9) None
Quality of imagery
Script imageability 88.3( 1 5 .0) 80.9( 1 9 .0) 83.3( 1 9 .4) 77.7( 2 1 .5) None
Voice on tape disturbing 2.00 (3.64) 2.47 (3.22) 1.39 (2.75) 2.45 (3.39) None
Vividness of images 6.88 (3.39) 6.98 (2.83) 6.81 (3.41) 6.78 (2.45) None
Nowness of images 5.16 (3.82) 3.49 (2.90) 4.06 (3.21) 4.23 (3.29) None
Emotions during imagery
Negative emotions 6.35 (2.71) 2.43 (2.19) 5.32 (2.68) 2.45 (1.89) Group, ηp2 = .334
Dissociation 4.14 (2.94) 2.01 (2.32) 2.65 (2.69) 0.96 (1.42) Group, ηp2 = .216
Script, ηp2 = .194
Note: Ranges: Script imageability: 0 to 100%; Voice characteristics: 0 (not disturbing) to 10 (very much
disturbing); Vividness and nowness during imagery, emotions during tape: 0 (not at all) to 10 (very
much); ηp2 effect size.
.31, p = .578, and script, F(1, 64) = 1.30, p =.258. Participants with PTSD took signiﬁcantly
longer to retrieve autobiographical information during the assault hot spot than those without
PTSD, F(1,65) =4.04, p=.049, but notduring theworstmoment ofthenegative event script,
F(1, 65) = 1.79, p = .181, with means pointing in the opposite direction. Estimated marginal
means tests revealed that the difference between the two scripts was signiﬁcant for the PTSD
group (p = .043), but not for the no-PTSD group (p = .338) (Figure 1). Order of imagery
scripts did not have an effect on retrieval times and did not interact with the other factors.
Correlations with impaired memory retrieval
Impaired accessibility of autobiographical information as measured by the difference between
retrievallatenciesforassaultandnegativeeventhotspotscorrelated,asexpected,withcognitive
processingduringtheevent, namely data-driven processing, r=.35,p=.004,lackofbinding,
r = .30, p = .014, and dissociation, r = .29, p = .019. It also correlated, as expected, with
the perceived nowness of intrusive memories, r = .35, p = .035; and with reexperiencing
symptoms as measured by the PDS, r = .40, p = .001.
Further analyses explored whether the difference in retrieval latencies between trauma
and negative event script was related to any of the demographic variables that had shown
group differences (ethnicity, socioeconomic status, employment). There were no signiﬁcant
associations (all p values greater than .304).
Discussion
Theexperimentusedanautobiographicalmemoryretrievaltaskduringscript-drivenimageryto
investigate the hypothesis that the worst moments of trauma memories in PTSD are disjointed230 B. Kleim et al.
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Figure 1. Mean latencies (in seconds) to retrieve autobiographical information during hot spots of
trauma and negative event scripts for assault survivors with and without PTSD. Signiﬁcant differences
are indicated. All other differences were nonsigniﬁcant.
from other autobiographical material. As expected, participants with PTSD took longer to
retrieve other autobiographical memories while imagining the worst moment of their assault
than participants without PTSD, while no such group difference was found while participants
imagined the worst moment of another negative event that had happened at a similar time.
Retrieval time differences were unrelated to objective assault severity, indicating that it is not
justthecomplexityoftheeventcontributingtolongerretrievallatencies.Thegroupdifferences
could not be attributed to general problems in autobiographical memory retrieval, as the PTSD
group showed similar retrieval latencies as the no-PTSD group before and after the imagery
tasks. This makes it unlikely that a general deﬁcit in attentional resources was responsible
for the ﬁndings (Kangas, Henry and Bryant, 2005), although we cannot completely rule out
a possible transitory attentional deﬁcit in participants with PTSD during the hotspot. The
results could also not be attributed to greater emotional arousal, as there was no group x script
interaction in negative emotions during scripts.
In line with our expectations, the PTSD group took longer to retrieve autobiographical
memories during trauma hot spots than during negative event hot spots. This ﬁnding parallels
Ehlers et al.’s (2004) clinical observation that the worst moments of the trauma appear
disjointed from subsequent information that updates the impressions the individual had atTrauma memories in PTSD 231
the time. It would be interesting to explore further what processes impede the integration of
trauma memory hot spots with subsequent information.
Thus, the ﬁndings provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that trauma memories in
PTSD may be insufﬁciently integrated into the autobiographical memory base, as proposed
by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) and Ehlers and Clark (2000). Other models of PTSD,
such as Brewin et al.’s (1986) Dual Representation Theory, which assumes a deﬁcit in verbally
accessible trauma memories, also appear compatible with the ﬁndings, as one could assume
that such a deﬁcit may lead to slower retrieval of verbal information when the trauma memory
is triggered.
Our results add to the growing literature on problems in autobiographical memory retrieval
in PTSD. They extend the results of studies showing that trauma survivors with PTSD
have problems with recalling trauma memories, in particular its worst moments, as an
organized event with a linear temporal sequence (e.g. Evans et al., 2007; Halligan et al.,
2003; Harvey and Bryant, 1999; Jones et al., 2007). The present data go beyond these ﬁndings
of disjointedness within the trauma memory, in that they suggest disjointedness between the
trauma memory and other autobiographical information. They also extend ﬁndings of an over
general memory bias in PTSD (Moore and Zoellner, 2007). Trauma survivors, in particular
those with PTSD, have been shown to exhibit problems in retrieving memories of speciﬁc
autobiographical events in response to emotional cue words. Note that in these experiments
trauma memories were not explicitly triggered. The present study required participants to
retrieve factual (neutral) autobiographical information. The results for retrieval before and
after the imagery tapes suggested that people with PTSD do not show a general impairment
in retrieving autobiographical information to factual questions, which contrasts the pattern of
groupdifferencesobservedforgeneratingautobiographicalmemoriesinresponsetoemotional
retrieval cues. Rather, the present study suggested that there was a speciﬁc deﬁcit in accessing
autobiographical information when people with PTSD recalled the worst moment of their
traumatic event, supporting the disjointedness hypothesis.
The Ehlers and Clark (2000) model further speciﬁes certain processing styles that are
expectedtoleadtosuchpoorintegrationoftheworstmomentsofthetraumamemorywithother
autobiographicalinformation,namelydata-drivenprocessinganddissociation.Consistentwith
themodel,questionnairemeasuresofdata-drivenprocessinganddissociationduringtheassault
correlated with the delayed retrieval of other autobiographical memories when remembering
trauma hot spots, as indexed by the difference in retrieval times between trauma and negative
events.Anexploratorymeasureofthelackofbindingofinformationduringtheassault(Ehlers
et al., 2004) also correlated with delayed retrieval during the assault script. Lack of integration
into the autobiographical memory base is thought to be one of the factors that explain re-
experiencing in PTSD (Ehlers and Clark, 2000). In line with this suggestion, the “nowness”
of intrusive memories and re-experiencing correlated with delayed retrieval. The pattern of
correlations is in line with the theory-derived hypotheses and thus supports the notion that the
experimental paradigm indeed assessed an index of poor memory integration.
The experimental task employed in this study was novel, and the results should therefore
be interpreted with caution. A number of further limitations need to be noted. First, the study
used a cross-sectional design that precludes causal interpretations. Second, due to the nature
of the study, only a limited number of autobiographical memories could be elicited. This
is likely to have increased error variance and decreased the power of the study to detect
group differences. Third, other explanations for the patterns of ﬁndings are possible. The232 B. Kleim et al.
PTSD group reported greater negative emotion during both the trauma and the negative
event script than the no-PTSD group. Although the pattern of group differences in the
questionnaire measures did not explain the pattern of differences in retrieval latencies, it
remainsconceivablethatotherdifferences,forinstanceinphysiologicalarousalorintransitory
attention, may in part be responsible for the observed differences. In future experiments, it
would thus be desirable to include further measures, such as psychophysiological measures,
and other questions that do not concern autobiographical memories (e.g. mental arithmetic)
to test whether the retrieval delays are speciﬁc to autobiographical material. Fourth, the no-
PTSD group reported some PTSD symptoms, and studying extreme groups may have given
clearer group differences. Fifth, we were unable to study whether the results are speciﬁc to
PTSD as we did not include a further group of trauma survivors with disorders other than
PTSD.
In conclusion, this experiment was to our knowledge the ﬁrst to experimentally investigate
the hypothesis that trauma memories lack integration into the autobiographical memory base
in PTSD (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers and Clark, 2000). The results support
the notion that the moments during the trauma that are later re-experienced are disjointed
from other autobiographical material. This would explain the clinical phenomenon that re-
experiencing appears to lack the context of other (often subsequent) information that corrected
impressions the person had at the time of the event (Ehlers et al., 2004) and is characterized
by a sense of “nowness”.
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